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How Hume’s Scepticism Regarding the Design Inference is still Applica-
ble Today
Peter Casurella,1 McMaster University
￿ . ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
I recently logged into a social networking site to find that a friend had
posted a humorous picture for my consideration. Before me, a young
man was gleefully engaged in an act of nasal exploration with his index
finger. The caption read: “Your finger fits perfectly into your nostril.
Checkmate, atheists”. This satirical picture is referring to the Argument
from Design, one of the classic approaches to arguing for God’s existence
via an analogous comparison of intentional and ordered objects created
by man, to the apparent intentionality and order of the universe; which,
it is argued, must likewise have an intelligent creator. In the example of
our friend above, the assumption is that it is no accident that one’s finger
conforms to the size of one’s nostril, but rather, that the convenience of
this arrangement was thought out beforehand by a god who made man
in such a way that objects could be removed with ease from one’s nose.
In his Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, the Scottish philoso-
pher David Hume began what many consider to be the most devastating
philosophical attack on the argument from design.2 His remarks here,
combined with his post-humously published attack on the design argu-
ment in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, are considered by many
1 Peter Casurella is a second year Masters student in philosophy at McMaster Uni-
versity, in Hamilton, Canada. His primary area of research is in the analytic phi-
losophy of religion; specifically focusing on arguments and digressions of interest
surrounding proofs for the existence of god.
2 Hume published this paper in 1757.
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to have greatly reduced its philosophical importance.3 However, despite
Hume’s attacks, the argument has persisted and evolved over the cen-
turies and arguably remains the single most compelling argument for
god’s existence. In his 2004 edition of The Existence of God, the esteemed
Oxford philosopher and theologian Richard Swinburne advances a prob-
abilistic form of the Argument from Design, building a case that the de-
sign inference leads us to believe that the existence of god is more likely
than the alternative. His argument connects with human intuitions in
a compelling way. However, he does not succeed in his project. This
paper will argue that Hume’s 250 year old scepticism regarding the de-
sign inference cannot be bypassed by Swinburne’s probabilistic attempt
at dodging its conclusions. I will begin by reviewing how Hume’s epis-
temological commitments lead him to conclude the irrationality of the
design argument. Next, we will examine how Swinburne goes about
trying to dodge the problems presented by Hume. Finally, if Hume’s
epistemology, or something like it, is correct, then I will show that Swin-
burne’s dodge fails to carry his conclusion clear of Hume’s scepticism.
￿ . ￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
The design argument is certainly not new. In the 4th century BC, Plato
wrote that one of the main reasons for men’s belief in the gods was “the
order of the motion of the stars, and of all things under the dominion
of the mind which ordered the universe” (Plato, 12.966e). Aristotle too
believed that the beauty of nature was what first caused men to wonder
about how the universe had come to be. He argues in On Philosophy
that anyone who observes the scope and beauty of nature would “judge
both that there exist gods and that all these marvelous works are the
handiwork of the gods” (Aristotle). In the middle ages, Thomas Aquinas
propelled the argument to lasting fame through his inclusion of it in his
five ways of knowing that God exists. Aquinas argues that any non-
conscious object, which exhibits purpose in its design, must be under
the direction of a conscious and intelligent being. In the same way that
arrows do not head towards a bulls-eye without intelligent direction,
neither do acorns grow into oaks without intelligent direction. Therefore,
everything in nature must be directed towards its goal by someone with
intelligence; e.g. God (Aquinas).
3 This paper was published twenty-two years later, in 1779.
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The Argument from Design really hit its stride in 1804, when William
Paley published his book, Natural Theology. In Paley’s defense of the
rationality of belief, he says that if a man were to find a watch while walk-
ing along a beach, and were to observe its intricate parts and ordered
operations, even if he had never before seen a watch, that man would
surely infer that some intelligence had designed it. Furthermore, if the
ordered contrivance of the watch leads us to infer that it must be the
product of an intelligent design, then observation of the natural world
should lead us to a similar conclusion regarding its origins. This is be-
cause, says Paley, “every indication of contrivance, every manifestation
of design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of nature”, and
what’s more, “that the contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances
of art, in the complexity, subtlety, and curiosity of the mechanism; and
still more, if possible, do they go beyond them in number and variety”
(Paley, 1804: 13). If this is true, then we cannot help but be drawn from
our observations of a world, which exhibits all the marks of design, to
the inference that there must be a designer.
￿ . ￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
Hume’s attack on this classic argument follows from his epistemologi-
cal stance on how humans acquire knowledge, and what the limits of
our knowledge are. Writing in the same philosophical tradition as John
Locke and René Descartes, Hume ascribed what is often called the ‘Idea
Theory’ of human cognition. In brief, Hume’s version of the Idea The-
ory holds that “all the materials of thinking are derived either from our
outward or inward sentiment”, meaning that every thought which we
are capable of, is produced either by impressions from external stimuli
(via our five senses) or through the recombination of those impressions
in our minds (1778, EHU: 2.5).4 Ultimately, the entirety of our ideas are
derived, directly or indirectly, from sense data which we receive through
our physical senses. Therefore, all we can know is that which we are able
to acquire either from sense data, or derive through a composition of
sensory impressions in the mind.
Of central importance is how we are able to form inferences regarding
cause and effect. Hume says that we cannot know the fundamental
principles behind causation, because this realm of inquiry is entirely
closed off to us (1778, EHU: 4.12). Having never before seen a billiard
ball, Hume asks the reader to consider how, by simply observing the ball,
a person could discover what its effects on other objects might be. It is
4 EHU will refer to Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
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only through the experience of watching how the billiard ball interacts
with other balls that we are able to discover what its effects on other
balls are (1778, EHU: 4.9). No reasonable inferences can be made from
the observation of one object towards what its effects might be. Our
limited human minds are simply incapable of delivering this kind of
knowledge to us a priori. Hume, thus, says that it is “in vain” that
we should “pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause
or effect, without the assistance of observation and experience” (1778,
EHU: 4.11).
The foundation of all our inferences is experience, and these infer-
ences are not founded on any rational processes or reasoning (1778,
EHU: 4.14). If our inferences regarding cause and effect were rational,
then we could observe the billiard ball and deductively reason our way
forward to what its effects must be without needing to see it in action
(1778, EHU: 4.15). However, since this is not the case, our inferences
must be considered irrational. All our conclusions regarding ‘cause and
effect’ are based on an expectation that similar causes will follow from
similar effects (1778, EHU: 4.20), and this expectation is only the result
of the brain becoming accustomed, through constant exposure to the
conjunction of two objects or events. In other words, to expect the one to
follow from the other, or to expect similar events to follow from similar
causes (1778, EHU: 5.4-5.5).
We shall see that it is this expectation of like events, following from
like causes, which gives rise to the design inference. Humans have be-
come deeply accustomed to the constant conjunction of machines, which
exhibit order, regularity, and purposefulness being created by an intel-
ligent human mind. Therefore, when we see purpose, regularity, and
order in nature, our minds are drawn by habit to a similar conclusion
regarding the universe as a whole. The fallacy is understandable, but a
fallacy, nonetheless.
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After presenting the argument above, Hume begins to follow its con-
sequences to their logical conclusions. In chapter 11 of the Enquiry, he
advances his doubts as to whether, in light of his version of the Idea The-
ory, the design inference can be rationally made at all. Hume presents
the design argument as an argument from analogy. Complex objects like
houses and watches are created by designers. The universe itself seems
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to be a complex object analogous to a house or a watch. Therefore, the
universe itself must have a designer.
In his later work, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume allows
the assumption that God really is the designer of the universe and goes
on to level five arguments against the soundness of the design inference,
based on the logical fallout which such an inference leads to. Firstly,
he says that the analogy is weak. It is not at all clear that the universe
so closely resembles a man-made machine that it always appears or-
dered or designed. Many inexplicable and seemingly random events
occur around us all the time. Next, Hume argues that the argument
is also underdetermined. We have no reason to believe that order and
complexity only arise from intelligence. “For all we know”, says Hume,
“matter may have a source of order within it, just as mind does, hav-
ing it inherently, basically, not acquired from somewhere” (1779, DCNR:
2).5 Further, Hume argues that if we posit an intelligent designer, that
designer must also possess the properties of order and complexity, be-
cause causes must contain sufficient properties to produce their effects,
and must be alike in enough ways such that the correlation is rational. If
God is comprised of order and complexity, then we are simply pushing
the query back one stage, and are then, left to wonder what caused an
ordered god?
Hume’s final two critiques in the Dialogues deal with the properties
of God which men have ascribed to him. It seems contradictory that a
perfect god should create a manifestly imperfect world. It also seems
impossible that we could reasonably infer from the universe’s creation,
any other quality about god, beyond those qualities absolutely necessary
to instantiate the universe.
However, Hume also shows that the design inference itself should
never be allowed off the ground in the first place. In Hume, Newton, and
the Design Argument, Robert Hurlbutt nicely summarises this argument:
The design argument is not scientific in that it offers no ev-
idence for the causes of the world order. The world is one
particular, not a member of a species, whose members have
been observed. In order to demonstrate a cause for any ef-
fect it is necessary to have observed the cause and effect in
conjunction, indeed, in constant conjunction. And no one
has seen the origin of one world, let alone “worlds” (Hurl-
butt, 1965: 151).
5 DCNR will refer to Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Hume’s comments on
this point are almost prophetic. The later development of the theory of evolution,
both biological and stellar, would later reinforce this point of his very strongly. In
many ways, matter does seem to organise itself, at least sufficiently, and for long
enough, to produce beings with the kind of complexity which we exhibit.
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On Hume’s understanding of cognition, causal inferences only arise
from cases where we have observed a constant conjunction between ob-
jects, such that the mind becomes accustomed to expect one object to
follow upon observation of the first. Every time we see a house being
built, we have also observed people actively building such things. The
conjunction of the two objects is very firmly fixed in our minds: intelli-
gent purpose and designed object. This is the case with all the objects
of human contrivance. Since our minds come to expect this conjunction,
whenever we see what appear to be objects, or systems, which seem to
exhibit order, complexity, and intent, we are naturally drawn to infer
that a designer must be the cause.
However, while it may be psychologically understandable why we
make the inference, this does not justify our application of this inference
to the universe as a whole. It is only “when two species of objects are
found to be constantly conjoined, that we can infer the one from the
other” (1778, EHU: 11.30). In the case of the instantiation of the universe,
we have only observed one instance of an effect without even observing
its cause. Therefore, we cannot make any rational conclusions about
what the cause of the universe must be.
￿ . ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
In his influential book Inference to the Best Explanation, Peter Lipton de-
scribes how these inferences work. When we find ourselves wanting to
explain a certain phenomenon, but insufficient data exists to deductively
describe the event, “given our data and our background beliefs, we infer
what would, if true, provide the best of the competing explanations we
can generate of those data”, so long as the best is good enough for us
to make any inference at all (1999: 58). Given competing explanations
for some event a, we compare and contrast rival explanations and deter-
mine which one is more likely to be true based on its ability to account
for the phenomena.6
Since Hume’s 18th century attack on the design argument, and in
light of the purchase his thought has gained in the intellectual commu-
nity, many of the more respected attempts to salvage the design infer-
ence have adapted by making IBE claims.7 In 2004, the distinguished
Oxford philosopher and theologian Dr. Richard Swinburne published
an updated edition of his book, The Existence of God. In this book Swin-
burne argues that although there are no good deductive arguments for
6 We also see if it has good fit with other observed phenomena and general rules.
7 Hereafter, let ‘IBE’ stand for ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’.
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the existence of God, a successful “P-inductive” argument can be built
to show that the existence of God is more likely than the alternative, and
therefore, is the best possible explanation for the universe (2004: 12-13).8
Acknowledging that the traditional starting points of the Argument
from Design are problematic, in light of both Hume’s scepticism and
the development of Evolutionary Theory, he instead sets out to simply
argue that it is more probable that a designer god exists than not, due to
the evident existence of ‘spatial order’ and ‘temporal order’. By spatial
order, Swinburne is referring to the apparent arrangement of nature in
orderly and purposeful ways, such as the structure of the human eye.
The character Cleanthes in Hume’s Dialogues sums up the idea of spatial
order nicely.
Consider, anatomise the eye; survey its structure and con-
trivance, and tell me, from your own feeling, if the idea of
a contriver does not immediately flow in upon you with a
force like that of sensation (1779: DCNR.3).
Not only does Swinburne see spatial order in the arrangements of
objects, but he considers nature to be like a ‘machine-making machine,’
in that it is constructed so as to give rise to the order which we see in the
eye. He supposes that the theory of evolution can be fully incorporated
into the design inference as a part of the intricate and ordered operations
of the universe, and argues that it is highly improbable that humans
would have evolved without an intelligent creator, god, to set up the
universe-machine to produce them.
A key supporting point for this argument is Swinburne’s supposition
that the universe has been ‘fine-tuned’ to allow for the development of
life. In brief, there are several fundamental forces in the universe which
govern the interaction of matter, and if the relative strengths of those
forces had been different by the smallest degree from what they are now,
then cosmic evolution would have followed a different path, and human
life would never have been able to evolve (Swinburne, 2004: 172-190).
In light of the great number of alternative ways the universe could have
been, Swinburne proposes that it is more likely than not that there is an
8 A ’P-inductive’ argument is one in which the premises add to the probability of
the conclusion, and a correct P-inductive argument is one in which the premises
make the conclusion more probable than its negation (Swinburne, 2004: 6). Swin-
burne examines the probability of the conclusions of several arguments, for and
against, the existence of god. He measures their relative strength in terms of the
extent they confirm the hypothesis that God exists. Swinbure intends to show
that if h is the hypothesis that God exists, and eb is the evidence from a particular
argument for God’s existence, then P(h b1+b2+b3 [. . . ] bn) > P( h b1+b2+b3 [. . . ]
bn). Therefore, it is more likely than not that God does exist.
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explanation that this universe exists, and not another. The most likely
explanation is a theistic god.
Swinburne thinks that his second argument, from temporal order, is
the strongest of the two. By temporal order, he is referring to “regu-
larities of succession”, or “patterns of behavior of objects”, such as the
perceived passage of time, the laws of physics, and the ‘physical laws’,
by which we are able to predict that certain future events will follow
from certain causes (2004: 151). Swinburne argues that even more than
spatial order, the idea that the world is characterised by a “vast perva-
sive order” lies at the core of the design inference (2004: 155). It seems
very unlikely that we could exist at all without the universe being char-
acterised by these pervasive regularities. Cognition seems to require it,
as does our day to day survival. Even the fundamental laws which give
rise to evolutionary development seem to require this kind of temporal
order (2004: 158).
Swinburne rejects two objections to his claim that the apparent tem-
poral order is significant. The first objection is that it is the human
mind which imposes order on the universe in order to meet the human
need for prediction and control. The second objection is that it should
not seem remarkable to us that the universe evinces order, because we
would not be here to question it if the right kind of order did not exist
in the first place (2004: 156).
In response to the first objection, Swinburne argues that it is the or-
der of the universe itself which is a necessary condition for our minds
to have evolved to their present state. If this is true, then even if hu-
man minds do impose some order on the universe, there must first have
been certain fundamental regularities already operating to have allowed
minds, which recognise order, to arise at all (2004: 156).
In response to the second objection, Swinburne appeals by analogy to
our ability to recognise when any given event is improbable. If you were
to flip a coin fifty times and see a head come up on every toss, the barest
knowledge of probability would inform you that you had just observed
an extremely improbable event. Now, if someone were to say to you,
“I will flip this coin fifty times and the moment a tail is flipped, I will
shoot you dead”. Upon seeing the fiftieth heads come up, you should
not be surprised because you could not have seen anything else and still
be conscious of it. Swinburne says that it is absurd to maintain that
we should not still think the situation highly improbable. Following the
analogy, it is therefore, perfectly rational to be surprised that we exist in
a universe like ours, given how many fortuitous roles of the cosmic were
needed for us to be here at all.
Swinburne’s move here is an interesting twist on an old line of reason-
ing known as the Anthropic Principle. The Anthropic Principle states
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that we should not be surprised to find ourselves existing, because if
things had been much different in the universe, we would not be here at
all to reflect upon the improbability of our existence. This line of reason-
ing is often deployed against the theistic assertion that our surprise at
finding ourselves here should lead us to infer that someone purposely
designed the universe to allow for our existence. Swinburne argues that
his alternate interpretation should be the preferred one because there ap-
pears to be far more order in the universe than would merely be required
for the existence of humans (2004: 156).
In summary, the phenomena of temporal order makes the existence
of god more probable because, of all the ways the universe could have
turned out, it happens that there do exist laws and regularities that ex-
plain how we could have developed, and how we are able to then “ex-
trapolate from past to future events with normal success” (2004: 164).
It is more probable that a proper explanation exists to account for this
than not.9
In essence, what Swinburne proposes is that there are two possibili-
ties: (1.) There is order and regularity in the world because there is a
god with all the sufficient properties to make it so. (2.) There is order
and regularity in the world and this is simply where the explanation
stops. Swinburne concludes that from both, the properties of spatial
and temporal order, (which we observe) that it is more probable for (1)
to be true; as opposed to the universe being simply, a brute fact.
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While well constructed and intuitively appealing, Swinburne’s argument
is flawed. In this final section I will demonstrate how his probabilistic
side-step fails to take the design inference clear of Hume’s sceptical at-
tack, by showing how the key analogy as to how we might draw infer-
ences regarding god, cannot be reasonably accepted.
To begin with, Swinburne’s overarching case for the existence of god
is a Bayesian approach, meaning that it makes use of Bayes’s Theorem to
calculate and compare conditional probabilities; which serve, to render
a judgment as to which condition is more likely to have produced the ob-
served effect. Bayes’s Theorem is used to render as true, any hypothesis
which a certain body of evidence confirms as probable, or more likely
than alternative hypotheses (Joyce). So, if we have a hypothesis (h), then
given certain evidence (e), the probability of (h) given (e) is greater than
( h) given (e). This is commonly expressed in the following way:
9 The proper explanation being god.
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P(h e) > P( h e)
In order to judge whether or not the design inference adds or detracts
from his overarching case, Swinburne needs to decide if the probability
of god’s existence, given the evidence from design, is greater or less
than 0.5. This figure is then incorporated into the overall evidence for
his cumulative case. As we have seen, Swinburne concludes that the
probability of god existing, given the evidence we have that spatial and
temporal order exist, is greater than the probability that temporal and
spatial order could exist without god existing. Is he justified in reaching
this conclusion?
Swinburne’s approach may seem very subjective, but this is precisely
what the Bayesian approach is meant to address. The approach allows
one to make intuitive and general claims about the relative probabili-
ties of various causes. Thus, we can make a claim about which is likely
to be the actual ‘explanation’, out of a pool of competing explanations.
So long as one’s conclusions are reasonable enough for most people to
accept them, then general probabilities can be assigned to cases. Sub-
sequently, these general probabilities can be added together to build a
strong evidential case for whatever hypothesis is the most likely candi-
date.
For example, take Swinburne’s discussion of the fine-tuning of the
universe. Naturally, there is no way to calculate how many possible cal-
ibrations of the fundamental forces of the universe would have allowed
cosmic evolution to give rise to life. However, it does seem reasonable
to assume that there are a great many more ways in which the cosmic
forces could have been arranged, such that human life never could have
arisen. If the number of situations which would have not given rise to
human life is judged to be greater than the number of situations which
would have, then we should conclude that the possibility of human life
not arising is statistically more probable. Given that we find ourselves
in the less likely state of being alive (in an apparently ordered universe),
then we are justified in thinking that it is probable that some explanatory
hypothesis (which explains our current state) is true; in contrast to just
assume that we have simply beat the odds.
Think back to the example of the coin toss. If we find ourselves alive
after the 50th toss, we might reasonably presume that the coin itself was
not fair. Perhaps both sides of the coin were imprinted with a head.
It seems more probable that there is some further explanation, which
might account for the unlikely series of coin tosses, other than dumb
luck. In thinking of the unlikely scenario in which we find ourselves in
the universe, the god hypothesis explains why we find ourselves here in
much the same way as the unfair coin hypothesis explains why the man
with the gun did not shoot me dead. The point is simply that, if one was
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asked to make an educated guess based on the data available, one will
either bet in favor, or against, the existence of god. For Swinburne, the
unlikelihood of finding ourselves here means that we ought to allot the
balance of probability in favor of the existence of god. If the probability
is only a fraction more convincing in favor of the god hypothesis than
not, then, we are justified in reasonably inferring that god really does
exist.
￿ . ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿ ￿￿-￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
No scientist would object to occasional uses of Bayesian calculations, in
fact such calculations are part of our day to day life, and can even be
descriptive of the foundations of very successful science. Mackie admits
that “we are justified in arguing inductively, in extrapolating observed
regularities to unobserved cases” (1990: 147). A beautiful example of
such successful reasoning was the discovery of the planet Neptune by
German astronomer Johann Gottfried Galle. Galle discovered Neptune
after several other astronomers had independantly predicted its exis-
tence based on irregularities in the orbit of Uranus. Galle theorised that
these irregularities were best accounted for by the gravitational influence
of a postulated, yet undiscovered, eighth planet. The prediction that
Neptune existed before it was discovered can be couched in Bayesian
terms as:
The probability that Neptune exists, given the evidence of
Uranus’s orbit and our understanding of gravitation, is greater
than the probability that Neptune does not exist.
There is a key difference between this example of a very successful
IBE and Swinburne’s argument for god’s existence. In the case of Nep-
tune, there was a probable cause, which fell within the realm of normal
science, which could potentially be investigated. If I am allowed to em-
ploy a bit of my own probabilistic reasoning here, it seems that it is
far more probable that an unobserved cause which operates within our
universe can be discovered, than that we could discover a cause of the
universe itself.
I might propose, for example, that the cause of the current universe
was a trans-dimensional, super-alien sneezing, and that the sneezing of
such aliens always produces explosions of space-time that have ordered
regularities as one of their inherent features. Now, it seems unlikely that
we would ever be able to investigate if my sneezing-alien theory is cor-
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rect, or rather, if the god hypothesis is correct. Since the conditions of
these possible causes are beyond the physical universe, then, the truth of
these matters lies beyond our ability to investigate them as well. How-
ever, this is simply an ad ignorantiam, and there is more we can say on
this issue.
When building an IBE argument, what makes an explanation ‘best’,
“is always relative to the available competitors it faces, meaning that IBEs
always involve comparative evaluations of evidential support among
competing hypotheses” (Ratzsh). Swinburne argues that what makes
god the best explanation is that the god hypothesis provides the sim-
plest explanation for the observed phenomenon (the universe); while, it
provides the greatest explanatory power when compared to other hy-
potheses (2004: 82). We are justified in believing that this hypothesis is
probably correct if “any gain of explanatory power would be outweighed
by a corresponding loss of prior probability”, and if “any gain in prior
probability would be outweighed by a corresponding loss of explanatory
power” (Swinburne, 2004: 82). The god hypotheses, argues Swinburne,
is the simplest hypotheses available, because all of the conditions neces-
sary for the instantiation of the universe are available in one explanatory
step; the actions of God. Positing any further beings beyond God gains
us no explanatory power. Nonetheless, why this hypothesis has greater
simplicity and explanatory power than competing explanations such as
the sneezing super-alien theory, is very puzzling.
In both theories, we have a practical end to investigation. We do
not possess the proper investigatory tools to look beyond the proposed
entity, in either case. It is not possible to discover any information about
whether or not there is an explanation of god or the super-sneezing alien,
and thus, our investigations must end with the postulation of some such
being as an explanation for the universe. The sneeze of the alien has all
the conditions necessary to create our universe, just like the proposed
properties of God. Both theories postulate only one being with sufficient
properties to create the current universe, and any other properties of
such a being are things which we can only speculate at.
Swinburne might argue that the infinite attributes of God, his om-
nipotence and omniscience for example, would count as more simple
properties than a super-alien with some definable set of finite properties.
Nevertheless, I suggest that the burden of proof rests on Swinburne’s
shoulders to show how some infinite set of properties that are sufficient
to create an ordered universe are any more simplistic than some unde-
fined set of finite properties, which are equally sufficient for creating an
ordered universe. If both are fully sufficient for instantiating the uni-
verse, how can we, from our limited perspective within the universe,
pass judgment on which scenario is more likely? The properties of the
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alien’s sneeze are sufficient for creating the universe, but we can not
reasonably infer anything else about these properties except their suffi-
ciency. By the exact same reasoning, although we might speculate that
God’s properties are infinite, all we can reasonably infer is that they are
equally sufficient for the instantiation of the universe. Beyond this limit,
we are at a loss, and the possible simpler infinity of god’s characteristics
will not help us adjudicate which theory is correct.
It seems that we cannot rationally adjudicate which theory has either,
greater explanatory power, or prior probability based on our current
evidence. The only advantage that the design hypothesis has over the
sneezing alien theory is that it connects well by analogy with our intu-
itions regarding purposeful design. But if something like Hume’s point
regarding our inability to make inferences where we have no experience
is correct, then we have no rational basis for judging which of these two
causes is more likely. We cannot know, then, if the analogy holds at
all. Thus, the analogy should not influence our adjudication of the issue.
For it to count in his favor, Swinburne would need to first show us that
knowledge of the domain beyond the physical universe can somehow
be accessed.
As a final point, I wish to point to the evidence of stellar and biolog-
ical evolution, which Swinburne himself does not reject, as a counter-
example to Swinburne’s desire to extend the intelligent design analogy
to account for the universe as a whole. At this point in our scientific
understanding of the world, we have a very good picture of how selec-
tive processes can lead to the refinement of matter into intricate systems.
From the evolution of the solar system down to the adaptations of white
and black moths in Great Britain to avoid predation, we see many exam-
ples of natural processes mimicking intelligent processes. It is not clear
at all that the apparent order of nature really is order. John Mackie ar-
gues that although we associate the products of human invention with
human intelligence, “we have no good empirical reason for taking the
‘marks of design’ as marks of design” (Mackie, 1990: 144). In fact, we
have no empirical evidence at all, since the realm of which we wish to
make causal claims of, is forever beyond our ability to observe. The
intuitive drive for why we should consider the design theory a better
explanation than its competitors is, therefore, not intuitive at all, but
actually a presumptuous mistake.
￿ . ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
In Hume’s Dialogues, the character Philo, (speaking for Hume himself)
argues: “Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We have no
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experience of divine attributes and operations” (1779, DCNR.2). There-
fore, Hume asserts that we can have no ideas regarding divine attributes
and operations, including ideas about the origin or design of the uni-
verse. For Swinburne’s argument to side-step Hume’s scepticism, he
would have to show, not only that the god-hypothesis is the most prob-
able cause of a universe that appears to be ordered, but also that we are
justified in:
(1) Identify what the causes of the universe might be.
(2) Assign relative probability values to these causes.
(3) Export our inferences from the physical realm (in which such pro-
cesses of reasoning are useful), to a realm which we are not justi-
fied in believing. And, see if this has any resemblance or commen-
surability with the rules and regularities of the observed universe.
Swinburne entirely fails to do any of these and his Bayesian instincts
are, thus, unjustified.
￿ . ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
If belief in the design hypothesis is so irrational, why is it that so many
people choose to believe it? Hume offers his error theory through the
lips of Philo, saying that people choose to accept the design argument
because it fits in nicely with their already existing web of beliefs. More-
over, they wish to continue holding those beliefs. Given the harshness
of life, the idea that there exists a perfect, eternal, and good creator who
will give humankind eternal happiness in an eternal ‘hereafter’ makes
the trials of this current life more bearable. Hume admits that the argu-
ments in favor of the design hypothesis are psychologically compelling,
but they are not in themselves, numerous or forcible (Hurlbutt, 2012:
165). Hume prescribes modesty to sooth the nerves of those who must
abandon the design hypothesis in light of his scepticism, saying that
by discovering our own limitations in these sorts of investigations, “we
may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance” (1778, EHU: 4.14).
Swinburne’s probabilistic attempt at doing an end-run around Hume’s
scepticism simply does not dodge far enough.
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